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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF TORTS WITH ANNOTATIONS TO
THE KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By ANDREW J. RUSSELL**
Chapter V.
CONSENT TO INTENTIONAL INVASIONS OF INTERESTS
OF PERSONALITY.
Secton 66. The consent to an intentional invasion of
one's interest of personality which prevents liability must be
(a) an actual or apparent assent to the particular inva-
sion suffered
(b) given
(i) to the person invading the interest.
(ii) by one who is capable of giving an effective con-
sent thereto, and whose assent has neither been
procured by such duress as makes it inoperative
as a consent nor given under a mistake as to the
validity of an asserted legal authority.
Comment:
The word "assent" is used to describe an actual or apparent
willingness to suffer a particular invasion. The word "consent"
is used as indicating an assent given under such conditions as
make it operative to prevent liability.
Annotation:
The Kentucky cases on consent seem to be very scarce.
Section 67. Consent may be given:
*Note.-This is the third installment prepared by the author and
published in the Kentucky Law Journal. Others will follow in 6ubse-
quent editions of this Journal.
**Andrew J. Russell, A. B., Berea College, 1926; LL. B., Yale Uni-
versity, 1928; Associated with Dean Robert M. Hutchins and Mr. Don-
ald Slessinger in the preparation of articles on the law of Evidence
and Psychology; author of "Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate
Consumer," Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. XXI; Professor of School
of Law, University of Louisville, since 1929.
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(a) by words or conduct or both which are intended to
express assent to the particular invasion and are so
understood by the person invading the interest, or
(b) by words or conduct or both which, while not in-
tended to express assent, would be understood by a
reasonable man and are understood by the person in-
vading the interest as so intended.
Illustrations:
(a) A goes to a dentist who takes an X-ray of his teeth.
The X-ray shows pyorrhceac pockets at the roots of two of the
teeth. The dentist advises A to have the two teeth extracted
and sends him to B, who specializes in extracting teeth. By
mistake, the dentist's assistant gives A an X-ray photograph of
C's teeth, which A gives to B, telling him to extract the teeth
indicated therein. B does so. B is not liable to A.
(b) A's right wisdom tooth has a small abscess-at its root.
He goes to B, who specializes in extracting teeth, and, by a slip
of the tongue, tells him that he wishes to have his right eye tooth
removed. B administers gas and extracts the eye tooth. B is
not liable to A.
(c) A desires to have a decayed wisdom tooth extracted.
He goes to B, a dentist, and by a slip of the tongue tells him
that he wishes B to extract his right eye tooth, which he de-
scribes as badly decayed. B administers gas to A and, though
on examination he discovers that the eye tooth shows no signs.
of decay and that the wisdom tooth is decayed, extracts the eye
tooth. B is liable to A.
(d) A proposes to kiss B. B neither resists nor protests by
word or gesture. A kisses B. B has given A reason to believe
that she has consented. A is not liable to B.
(e) A is injured in a railway accident. B, a surgeon, who
is also a passenger, paints a cut received by A with a painful
disinfectant. A, though conscious, does not object or resist. B
is not liable to A.
(f) A says to B: "I am going to knock you down," and
raises his hand to strike. B stands his ground, makes no pro-
test and does not attempt to defend himself. A knocks B down.
A is liable to B.
(g) A, a member of a football team, tackles B, a player on
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the opposing side. A's conduct is within the rules of the game.
A is not liable to B.
(h) A, a member of a football team, tackles B, an opposing
player, while he, A, is "offside." The tackle is made with no
greater violence than would be permissible by the rules and
usages of football were he "onside." A has not subjected B to
a violence greater than, or different from, that permitted by the
rules, although he is guilty of a breach of a rule. A is not liable
to B.
(i) A, while tackling B, deliberately knees him. A is liable
to B, whether the tackle was or was not otherwise within the
rules and usages of football.
Annotation:
In an action against defendant for performing an operation on
plaintiff negligently and without her consent, the court reversed a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff with directions to instruct the jury
on the question of consent as follows: "If the defendant understood
and had reasonable ground to understand, from the words or conduct
of the plaintiff, that she was willing for the operation to be performed
while she was under the anesthetic if upon his examination of her he
found it necessary, and upon the examination he found the operation
to be necessary and he so performed it, then he had the right to per-
form the operation as by her consent. Reasonable grounds are such
grounds as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence to so under-
stand under the circumstances." Van Meter v. Crews (1912), 149 KY,
335, 148 S. W. 40.
Section 68. The assent must be given by the person whose
interest is invaded or by one having power to give consent for
him.
Illustration:
(a) A goes to a hospital to be operated upon for appen-
dicitis. He is taken to the operating room. By a mistake of the
hospital force, B, the surgeon who is to operate upon him, is
given the record of C instead of the record of A. C's record
calls for an operation upon a tumor in his back. Misled by this
error, B makes an incision in A's back before the error is dis-
covered. B is liable to A.
Annotati m:
No Kentucky authorities.
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Section 69. The assent must be given to the person who
invades the interest.
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
Section 70. (1) To be consent the assent must be to the in-
vasion and not merely to the conduct which causes it.
(2) If the conduct is such that a reasonable man would
know (a) that it amounts to an invasion, or (b) that the inva-
sion would necessarily result from it, assent to the conduct is
apparent assent to the invasion and, if so understood by the
person inflicting it, is consent.
Illustrations:
(a) A is going to a fancy dress ball. He permits B to
stain his face with walnut juice. B assumes that A knows that
walnut juice produces a lasting stain. Though this is a matter
of common knowledge, A is in fact ignorant of it. B is not
liable to A.
(b) A takes liberties with B's person. B submits thereto
in the mistaken belief that A is her husband. B's submission is
not consent and A is liable to B if A knows, or has reason to
know, of B's mistake, or has impersonated B's husband.
(c) A, a physician, induces B to consent to an operation
upon her sexual organs. A violates B, who submits not realizing
that A is having intercourse with her, but believing that his
act is part of the operation. A is liable to B.
(d) A assents to B's touching him with a piece of metal
which is heavily charged with electricity. B knows that it is
so charged and that A is ignorant thereof. A sustains a severe
and painful shock. B is liable to A.
(e) A, knowing that his wife is alive, goes through a biga-
mous form of marriage with B. A and B live together as man
and wife. A is liable to B.
(f) A, a physician, called to attend B in childbirth, takes
C, a layman, with him. B believing, as C knows, that he is a
physician, permits him to attend her during her confinement.
C, under A's direction, holds B's hands. C is liable to B.
(g) A, a physician, induces B to unnecessarily expose her
lKENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
person by telling her that this is necessary for a thorough diag-
nosis and assists her in taking off her clothing. A is liable to B.
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
Section 71. (1) To be consent the assent must be to an
invasion substantially the same as that which is inflicted.
Illustrations:
(a) A consents to have his eyes examined by B, an oculist.
B intentionally makes an incision in A's eye, which is not a
part of the examination. B is liable to A.
(b) A, a surgeon, advises B that it is necessary to have a
part of his shin bone removed because of its diseased condition.
B submits to anesthesia for that purpose. During the course of
the operation A discovers that it is not necessary to remove the
bone and that a curettage is all that is necessary. A performs
the curettage. A is not liable to B.
(c) A goes to a hospital for observation. His attending
physician, B, recommends an operation. A consents to be
operated upon by C, but by C only. A is taken into the opera-
ting room and put under anesthetics. C is suddenly called away
and is unable to perform the operation, which is performed by
D, a surgeon of equal ability to C. D knows all the circum-
stances. The operation is successful. D is liable to A.
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
(2) If one whose interest of personality is invaded under
an asserted legal authority, submits to the invasion under a
mistake, whether of law or fact, as to its validity, his submis-
sion is not a consent to the invasion.
Illustration:
(d) A exhibits to B a paper purporting to be a warrant
for B's arrest, and says: "You are under arrest." B, believing
it to be a valid warrant, submits to arrest and permits A to
handcuff him. The warrant is invalid. A's submission is not a
consent.
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Annotation:
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 72. Assent to an invasion substantially the same
as that inflicted is consent and prevents liability for the inva-
sion of any interest of personality, other than the interest in
freedom from bodily harm, although it is given under a mis-
take as to any collateral matter, induced by the fraudulent
misrepresentations of the person inflicting it or otherwise
known to him
Illustration:
(a) A, a surgeon, induces B to submit to a treatment of
his eye by false representations that the treatment will cure his
vision. A's sole purpose is to obtain a fee. The treatment in-
volves a trifling touching of the eye, but does no substantial
harm. A is not liable to B.
Anmotatiom:
No Kentucky authorities.
Section 73. (1) An assent to an invasion of an interest of
personality is not operative as a consent if it is procured by
duress.
(2) The duress which renders an assent inoperative as
consent may be by imprisonment of or threats to immediately
imprison the other or a member of his immediate family, or the
application of physical force or threats thereof to the person
of the other or a member of his immediate family.
(3) The imprisonment or violence must be imposed, ap-
plied or threatened for the purpose of overcoming the other's
will and coercing him into assenting to the invasion and must
have caused the other to assent thereto.
No decision has held that duress, other than that stated in Section
73(2) renders assent to an invasion of an interest of personality in-
operative. This section states the effect of the decided cases and is not
intended to express any opinion as to the advisability or inadvisability
of recognizing other forms of duress as rendering consent procured
thereby Inoperative.
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Illustration:
(a) A points a revolver which B believes to be loaded at
C, B's child, and threatens to shoot C if B does not submit to
degrading familiarities. B submits thereto to save her child.
A is liable to B.
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
Section 74. If a person whose interest is invaded is at the
time, by reason of his youth or permanently or temporarily de-
fective mental condition, incapable of understanding or appre-
ciating the consequences of the invasion:
(a) his assent to the invasion is not consent thereto;
(b) the consent of a parent, guardian or other person
standing in like relation to him, if it is within his power to
give it, has the same effect as his own assent would have if he
had the capacity to give consent.
Illustrations:
(a) A, a boy of seven, consents to an operation, the serious
character of which a child of his age could not appreciate. B,
the surgeon performing the operation, is liable to A.
(b) A induces B to drink whiskey in such quantities as to
cause him a serious illness. B is already so drunk as to be in-
capable of appreciating the consequences of what he is doing.
A is liable to B.
(c) A, a boy of seven, engages in a friendly fight with his
schoolmate, B, in the course of which B slaps A's face. A's
guardian has expressly forbidden A to fight with B. B is not
liable to A.
(d) A, a girl of fifteen, permits B to kiss her. A's parents
have expressly forbidden A to associate with B. B is not liable
to A.
(e) A, a boy of seven, is bitten by a mad dog. His guard-
ian, B, takes him to C, a physician, who with B's consent but
against the strenuous objections of A, cauterizes the wound.
C is not liable to A.
Annotation:
No Kentucky decisions.
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Section 75. Except as stated in Section 76, consent pre-
vents an invasion from being actionable although the invasion
consented to is a crime.
NoTE: This section states the view of a numerical minority of the
American jurisdictions before which the question has been presented
for decision. The reasons for preferring the minority view are stated
in the Treatise.
Illustrations:
(a) A and B engage in a boxing match which is illegal
because the required license has not been obtained. Each is
guilty of a breach of the peace, but neither is liable to the other.
(b) A and B after an altercation agree to a fist fight. A
gives B a black eye. A is not liable to B.
(e) A and B agree to fight a duel with pistols. A fires at
B and his bullet strikes and breaks B's arm. A is not liable
to B.
(d) A, at B's solicitation, performs a criminal abortion
upon her. The operation is skilfully performed. A is not
liable to B.
Annotation:
Where two engage in voluntary mutual combat neither can re-
cover. McNeil v. Choate (1923), 197 Ky. 682, 247 S. W. 955; Ly7kins v.
Hammick (1911), 144 Ky. 80, 137 S. W. 852.
The defendant induced the plaintiff to submit to an abortion. De-
fendant was not the physician. There was no recovery. Goldmanner
v. O'Brien (1896), 98 Ky. 569, 33 S. W. 831, 56 Am. L. R. 378, 36 L. R. A.
715.
Where one sought and brought on the difficulty he could not re-
cover. Chandler v. Newton (1892), 13 Ky. L. R. 927.
Section 76. Where it is a crime to inflict a particular in-
vasion of an interest of personality upon a particular class of
persons, irrespective of their assent, and the policy of the law
is primarily to protect the interests of such a class of persons
from their inability to appreciate the consequences of such an
invasion and is not solely to protect the interests of the public,
the assent of such a person to such an invasion is not consent.
Illustrations:
(a) A statute makes it rape to have intercourse with a
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girl under the age of eighteen even with her assent. The prin-
cipal purpose of the statute is to protect young girls of imma-
ture judgment from the consequences of their folly. A is seven-
teen years of age. B, with A's assent (or at her solicitation),
has intercourse with her. A's consent does not prevent B from
being liable to her.
(b) A statute makes adultery a crime. The purpose of
the statute is to protect the interest of the state in the mar-
riage relation and of the innocent spouse in the marital fidelity
of his consort. A commits adultery with B. Neither is liable
to the other for the contacts inseparable from their crime.
Annotation:
There are no authorities in civil cases in this jurisdiction. But
see the following criminal cases:
A female under 16 years of age is incapable of giving consent to
either intercoures or attempted intercourse. Nider v. Commonwealth
(1910), 140 Ky. 684, 131 S. W. 1024, Ann. Cas. 1913, E. 1246.
An idiot is incapable of consenting to intercourse. Jones v. com-
monwealth (1876), 9 Ky. Opin. 204.
In an indictment for carnally knowing a girl under 16 years of
age it is not necessary to allege her lack of consent. Morgan v. Com-
monweath 11928), 222 Ky. 742, 2 S. W. (2d) 370.
Consent of the female is no defense to an indictment for incest.
Burdue v. Commonwealth (1911), 144 Ky. 428, 138 S. W. 296.
Section 77. An invasion of an interest of personality of
another who has not consented thereto does not create lia-
bility, if:
(a) the other is at the time physically or otherwise in-
capable of giving consent or his consent or the con-
sent of one having power to consent for him for any
other reason cannot be obtained, and
(b) an emergency has arisen which makes it actually or
apparently necessary to invade his interest of person-
ality before there is an opportunity to obtain bis con-
sent, and
(c) the invasion is, or is reasonably believed by the actor
to be, so manifestly to the other's advantage that a
reasonable man would give his consent to it if he had
the opportunity to do so, and
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(d) the actor neither knows nor has reason to know that
the other would not give his consent were there an
opportunity to ask it.
Illustrations:
(a) A is delirious and in his delirium threatens to throw
himself from the window or otherwise commit suicide. B locks
the door and windows to prevent him from carrying out his de-
lirious purpose. B is not liable to A.
(b) A in delirium attempts to do violence to himself. B,
his attendant, binds his hands and feet to prevent his doing so.
B is not liable to A.
(c) A pushes B, a blind man, out of the path of an ap-
proaching automobile, throwing him to the ground. A is not
liable to B.
(d) A is run over by a railway train and is carried uncon-
scious to a hospital in which B is the resident physician. His
foot apparently requires immediate amputation to save his life.
B amputates his leg before A regains consciousness. B is not
liable to A.
(e) A consents to a particular operation and for that pur-
pose places himself in the hands of B, a surgeon, and submits
to anesthesia. Upon opening A's body B discovers conditions
which make it necessary to extend the operation or to perform
a different operation from that consented to. The conditions
apparently require the new or extended operation to save A's
life or to accomplish the cure desired by him, and its postpone-
ment would involve pain and distress to A out of proportion
to the risk of the new operation. A reasonable man would con-
sent to the operation if he knew of the conditions discovered
by B. B performs the operation. B is not liable to A.
(f) If, in addition to the facts supposed in the previous
illustration (e), B knows that A would not consent to the new
or extended operation, B is liable to A.
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
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TOPIC B. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSONS*
Section 95. The intentional invasion of any of another's
interests of personality by means not intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury, when inflicted for the pur-
pose of preventing an invasion of any such interest of a third
person, is privileged if
(a) the third person is privileged, or the actor, because of
a reasonable mistake of fact, believes him to be privi-
leged to inflict in his own defense a like invasion of
the other's interest of personality, and
(b) the actor's intervention is necessary, or the actor,
because of a reasonable mistake of fact, believes it to
be necessary, to protect the third person, and
(c) the third person is:
(i) a member of the actor's immediate family or
household, or
(ii) a person whom the actor is under a legal duty to
protect, or
(iii) a person whom the actor reasonably believes to
require his protection.
Illustrations :
(a) A, seeing B apparently about to subject A's daughter
C to insulting familiarities, is privileged to use any reasonable
means to prevent B from doing so.
(b) A sees B about to strike his son C. B is in fact privi-
leged to do so to defend himself against an attack made upon
him by C. A, who has just come upon the scene, has no reason
to believe that his son is the aggressor. A is privileged to use
reasonable force to prevent B from striking C.
Special Note: There is a conflict of authority upon the
principles stated in Clause (a) of this Section. The view stated
therein is preferred to the view that the actor who intervenes to
*Note--This section follows the question of self-defense in the
restatement. The convenience occasioned by the length of the sec-
tions involved Is the reason for moving this section forward.
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protect a third person puts himself in the place of the third
person and acts in the vicarious exercise of his privilege of self-
defense and so is privileged only to the same extent as the third
party. Under the latter view the actor stands, as it were, in the
shoes of the third party and takes the risk that he for any reason
may have no privilege to defend himself even though the actor
reasonably believes in the existence of facts which if true would
make the third party privileged to do so. The actor's mistaken
belief that self-defense is necessary is sufficient, if induced by a
reasonable mistake of fact, to give him the privilege to defend
himself; and there is no reason to put the risk of reasonable
error upon the actor because he is acting for the protection of
the limited class of third persons for whose protection he is
entitled to intervene rather than for his own protection. In
both situations the test of the existence of the privilege of self-
defense should be either objective or subjective-its existence
should depend upon the actual situation or upon what the actor
reasonably believes to be the situation. It should not be ob-
jective in the one and subjective in the other.
Annotation:
Accord with illustration (a) Givens v. Berkley (1900), 108 Ky.
236, 56 S. W. 158; Graus v. Weller (1872), 4 Ky. Op. 535; Shields v.
Yeal (1914), 158 Ky. 695, 166 S. W. 211.
There seems to be some conflict in Kentucky on illustration (b).
See Brown v. Bowen (1904), 26 Ky. L. R. 291, holding that the law
court should have instructed the jury "That the other defendants had
a right to do for their father what he had a right to do for his own
self-defense." (The father was in the combat and the defendant's sons
came to his aid.) The court stated further that the sons' right of self-
defense was dependent upon his father having the same right. But
see Downs v. Jackson (Ky. 1910), 128 S. W. 339. The court sent the
case back for a new trial with directions to give the following instruc-
tions: "If you believe from the evidence that at the time the de-
fendant assaulted and beat the plaintiff the defendant in good faith
believed, and had reasonable ground to believe that either his son
Roy, or Joe, was then and there in danger of bodily harm about to
be ihflicted upon him by the plaintiff, and the defendant used no more
force than was necessary, or offered to him in the exercise of a rea-
sonable judgment to be necessary, to protect either of his said sons
from injury at the hands of the plaintiff you will find for the de-
fendant."
K. L.-8
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Illustration:
(c) A, who is ignorant that his son B is rehearsing for a
play, enters the room in which the rehearsal is taking place and
sees C pointing a revolver at B and announcing his intention to
shoot B. A knocks C down. A is not liable to C, although C's
actions were merely part of the play and the revolver was, as B
knew, unloaded.
Special Note: Here, as in Clause (a), there is a conflict of
decision. The view here stated is adopted for substantially the
same reason which is stated as requiring the adoption of the
view stated in Clause (a).
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
Comment to Clause (c) :
The actor may intervene to protect a third person if the
conditions stated in Clauses (a and b) exist and the third party
is (i) a member of the actor's immediate family or househld,
or (ii) a person whom the actor is under a legal duty to protect,
or (iii) a person whom the actor reasonably believes to require
his protection.
Special Note: The privilege to intervene to protect third
persons from invasions of their interests of personality which
involve no danger of death or serious injury was originally held
to exist only where the actor and the third person were members
of the same family or household, including in the latter terms
master and domestic servants. In the earliest cases the privi-
lege is said to be based upon the husband's or master's interest
in the services of his wife or servant, and so was analogous to
the privilege of an owner to protect his property from injury.
But the privilege was soon extended to cases in which the actor
had no semblance of property interest in the person whom he
protected, as in the case of a wife or servant going to the pro-
tection of a husband or master. Where such relationship ex-
isted the cases seem to go further than to permit intervention to
protect a member of the family or household from injury. They
seem to be based upon the feudal concept that the head of the
household and his family and servants were one group who, as
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such, were not only entitled but were even bound to assist one
another in any difficulty, whether it threatened injury or not.
The restriction of the privilege to intervene on behalf of
third persons to those who are members of the actor's family or
household, founded, as it is, upon conditions long since past,
should not be rigidly insisted upon. Indeed, such a restriction
is inconsistent with the duties which the law imposes upon
persons standing in many relations to others and which require
them to protect such others from the invasion of their rights of
personality. Obviously it is impossible that liability should be
imposed as a penalty for doing that which there is a legal duty
to do. It would be an absurdity to hold the actor liable to an-
other to whom he owed a duty of protection if he failed to per-
form that duty and at the same time to hold him liable to any
third person whose interests he invaded in the performance of
that duty.
But even though there is no relation which imposes a legal
duty to act for the protection of another, the restriction of the
privilege to intervene for the protection of third persons, even
from harm less than death or serious injury, to members of the
same family or household is opposed to the settled usages of
modern society. There are many situations where one person
so far comes under another's protection that the other is uni-
versally recognized as being under a moral and social, though
not a legal, duty to protect him or her. Not only would any
man in such a situation feel it obligatory upon him to act for
the protection of such a person but his failure to do so would
be regarded by the community as socially disgraceful. The
force of such moral and social duties is recognized in that branch
of the law of Torts which determines the conditions under which
the publication of defamatory matter is privileged. And it
would seem that there is equal reason to recognize the force
of such duties in creating a privilege to intervene for the protec-
tion of one whom the actor, in accordance with the general
opinion of society, regards as requiring his protection and that
here as in the privilege to publish defamation, the fact that the
third person asks assistance should create a privilege under
circumstances which might not otherwise justify the actor in re-
garding such person as requiring protection. The more precise
definition of the situations in which a reasonable man would
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regard third persons as requiring his protection, must be left
to the good sense and discretion of the courts before whom cases
of this sort may come in the future.
Illustrations:
(d) A intervenes to prevent B from striking his son, C. C
was in fact the aggressor and as such was not entitled to use
force to prevent the self-defensive touching by B. A's act is
excused unless he knew or should have known that C was the
aggressor.
(e) A is the conductor of a railroad train in which B and
C are passengers. D and E, who are also passengers, become
disorderly. D attempts to kiss B and E attempts to knock C
down. A is privileged to apply any reasonable force to D and
E which does not threaten death or serious injury to them and
which is necessary to protect B and C.
(f) A takes his wife, B, and her friend, Miss C, to the
theatre. On their return, D attempts to take liberties with B,
and E attempts to take liberties with C. A knocks them both
down with his cane, inflicting painful but not serious injuries
upon them. A is not liable to either D or B.
(g) A sees B, while drunk, attempt to put his arms around
C, a woman who is a stranger to both. A is privileged to use
reasonable force to prevent B from carrying out his purpose,
if C appeals to him for protection.
Annotation:
See cases cited supra, note 15.
Iflstrtions:
(h) A in joke is about to point an unloaded pistol at B
who has no reason to know that it is unloaded. C, B's husband,
seizes A and takes the pistol from him. C is not liable to A.
(i) A enters a room where B is lying, desperately ill and
takes from a drawer a pistol which B believes to be loaded. A
is about to point it at B when C, B's father, who knows that the
pistol is unloaded, sees from the next room what A is doing. C
shoots A, seriously injuring him. C is not liable to A if he
reasonably believed that he could not otherwise prevent A from
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pointing the pistol at B and so causing B a fright which might
seriously endanger his life.
Annotation:
No Kentucky authorities.
Section 96. The intentional invasion of any of another's
interest of personality is privileged when inflicted for the pur-
pose of protecting any third person from death or serious
bodily injury if
(a) the third person is privileged, or the actor, because
of a reasonable mistake of fact, believes him to be
privileged to inflict in his own defense a like invasion
of personality, and
(b) the actor's intervention is necessary, or the actor, be-
cause of a reasonable mistake of facts, believes it to
be necessary, to protect the third person from death
or serious bodily injury.
Comment:
This Section states only the condition under which the use
of force intended or likely to cause death or serious injury to
another is privileged for the purpose of defending a third per-
son from bodily harm. The use of such, force may be privileged
for other purposes. Indeed, it is rare that a situation arises in
which the privilege stated in this section is needed. In the ma-
jority of cases in which force is intended or likely to cause death
or serious injury is applied, the third person's bodily security is
imperiled by an act which is actually or apparently not only a
crime, but a crime of such a sort that the actor is privileged to
kill or inflict serious bodily injury if necessary to prevent its
commission.
Illustrations:
(a) A sees B apparently about to intentionally shoot C, a
stranger to B. A forcibly disarms B and in so doing injures
B's arm. A is not liable to B.
(b) Under circumstances identical with those given in Il-
lustration (a) except that A shoots and hills B, A is not liable
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under a "death statute" not only because his act was necessary
to protect C's life but also because it was necessary to prevent B
from committing what reasonably appeared to A to be murder.
AnnKotattn:
No Kentucky authorities.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXII January, 1934 Number 2
Published four times a year by the College of Law, University of Ken-
tucky: Issued in November, January, March, and May.
Subscription Price $2.50 Per Year .. .. 75c Per Number
EDITORIAL BOARD
Roy MORELAND, Faculty Editor
Bucm MoiroRD, Student Editor
DAN MARTIN, Managing Editor
KxIn MOBERLY, State Bar Association Editor
J. R. RIoHARDsoN, Circulation Manager
MARTHA MANNING, Book Reviews and Legislation
W. R. JONES, Business Manager
ELEANOB DAwsoN ROBERT HATTON HARRY STEGwrAIF_
DEuOND DEwEEsE WILLIAM MELLOR H. C. SMITH
GEORGE ELDRED BYRON PUMPHEREY
ADVISORY BOARD FROM KENTUCKY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
WILLIAM GEss, Lexington, Chairman
Term Expires 1934 Term Expires 1935
RCioa~r STOLIL Lexington KnG SwoP, Lexington
NEVILLE MILLER, Louisville LORENZO K. WOOD, Hopkinsville
ROBERT T. CALDWELL, Ashland H. H. FUsoN, Harlan
J. PELHAM JOHNSTON, Lexington R. M. HOLLAND, Owensboro
MARTIN GLENN, Madisonville CHARLES I. DAwsON, Louisville
J. M. STEVENSON, Winchester GEORGE RAGLAND, Chicago
WILsoN W. WYATT, Louisville W. H. REES, Maysville
IN MEMORIAM
Judge T. E. King, of Cynthiana, Kentucky, died on the
25th day of July, last. He was serving his second term as Com-
monwealth's Attorney, of the eighteenth Judicial District. He
had served 3 terms as County Judge of Harrison County, Ken-
tucky. Judge King attended the University of Kentucky and
read law with Judge W. T. Lafferty, who was the Dean of the
College of Law at the time of his death.
Judge King was an able lawyer and possessed a fine law
library.
